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Email security analysis

This topic is the single home for reading a domain’s mail posture: SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MX and how they combine. Other guides point here.

Email authentication relies on three DNS-based mechanisms:

  • SPF - authorized sending IPs
  • DKIM - cryptographic message signing
  • DMARC - policy enforcement and reporting

Where the data comes from

Two tools answer mail questions:

ToolWhat it gives
datapulse_live_dns(domain="example.com")The raw records: MX, TXT (SPF is a TXT record starting v=spf1) and a dmarc field holding the _dmarc.<domain> TXT lookup, in one call
datapulse_live_domain_health(domain="example.com")An evaluated mail section: SPF lookup and void-lookup counts and the final all qualifier, DMARC policy and tags, MX targets checked for addresses, DKIM keys at a probed set of selectors, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT, each with findings

Field-by-field detail for the health report’s mail section is in datapulse_help(topic="domain_health_fields"). The live_dns response shape is in datapulse_help(topic="dns").

The default live_dns lookup includes MX, TXT and the _dmarc TXT record (the full list and what the summary strips: “Default lookup” in datapulse_help(topic="dns")).

SPF

A TXT record starting with v=spf1:

v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
QualifierMeaning
+allPass all (defeats SPF)
-allHard fail unauthorized senders
~allSoft fail (mark but accept)
?allNeutral (no policy)

SPF allows at most 10 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect); the health report counts them in mail.spf.lookups and evaluates the qualifier the record really ends with, following redirect=.

Suspicious IP literals in SPF

include: and the final qualifier are not the whole record: ip4: and ip6: mechanisms can authorise unusual address space. Non-public space in SPF is potentially hostile or, at minimum, a misconfiguration; published SPF normally references globally routable sending infrastructure. The ones worth naming:

  • IPv4 RFC 1918 private ranges in ip4:: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16
  • IPv6 ULA space in ip6:: fc00::/7, including fd00::/8
  • Other non-routable or special-use space: loopback, link-local, unspecified
  • Malformed or impossible literals and prefix lengths
v=spf1 ip4:10.0.0.0/8 -all
v=spf1 ip6:fd00::/8 include:_spf.example.net ~all
v=spf1 ip4:300.1.2.3 -all
v=spf1 ip6:fd00::/129 -all

An SPF finding is most useful when it names the exact mechanism and why it is unusual: “ip4:10.0.0.0/8 is RFC 1918 private space and should not appear as public sending infrastructure in SPF.”

DMARC

The dmarc field of a default live_dns response holds the _dmarc.<domain> TXT lookup. Its status is one of:

statusMeaning
foundrecord holds the full DMARC value
noneThe lookup answered and there is no DMARC record (NXDOMAIN, or no v=DMARC1 TXT)
unknownThe lookup itself failed (SERVFAIL, REFUSED), so whether a record exists was not determined

unknown is not none: a failed lookup is not evidence that the domain publishes no policy.

Subdomains inherit. The lookup is _dmarc.<exact name> only. For a name below its registrable domain (www.osu.edu, mail.example.co.uk), a receiver that finds no record there falls back to the organizational domain’s record (RFC 7489 §6.6.3) and applies its sp= policy, or its p= when there is no sp=. So status: none on a subdomain does not mean the name is unprotected: www.osu.edu has no record of its own and is covered by osu.edu’s sp=reject. A subdomain is graded on the registrable domain’s record (datapulse_live_dns(domain="osu.edu")) when it has none of its own.

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com
PolicyMeaning
p=noneMonitor only (no enforcement)
p=quarantineMark as spam
p=rejectReject unauthorized mail
TagPurpose
pPolicy for the domain
spPolicy for subdomains
ruaAggregate report destination
rufForensic report destination
pctPercentage of mail the policy applies to

DKIM

DKIM keys live at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>, and selectors are arbitrary strings chosen by the domain owner. They cannot be enumerated. The health report probes a fixed set of common selectors (mail.dkim.selectors_probed) and reports the keys it found; a single selector can be checked directly:

datapulse_live_dns(domain="google._domainkey.example.com", record_type="TXT")      # Google Workspace
datapulse_live_dns(domain="selector1._domainkey.example.com", record_type="TXT")   # Microsoft 365

An empty selectors_found means none of the probed names answered, not that the domain lacks DKIM: google.com signs with dated selectors (20251104) that no fixed list guesses. An undetermined DKIM status is an absence of evidence, not adverse evidence.

v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkq...

MX and mail posture

An MX record is a claim, not a credential

Anyone may publish an MX pointing at any host, including a major provider’s, without that provider having provisioned anything. A recognisable platform hostname is not evidence that the platform accepts mail for the domain.

Hosted platforms derive the inbound hostname from the tenant’s own domain. For Exchange Online, a correctly provisioned record for example.com reads example-com.mail.protection.outlook.com: the domain’s own label with dots replaced by hyphens. An MX that names a different organisation’s tenant hostname is a record that was copied rather than provisioned, and the platform disowns it at delivery time:

550 5.7.64 TenantAttribution; Relay Access Denied

Such a record is decorative: it survives any check that performs the MX lookup and stops there. Reading the MX hostname against the domain publishing it comes before any conclusion about the platform it names. Matching an MX suffix identifies the platform, never the account holder.

Inbound and outbound are separate questions

A broken inbound path does not narrow the outbound one. With no SPF and no DMARC, nothing prevents a third party sending mail as the domain, whether or not it can receive any. SPF and DMARC stand on their own; the presence or absence of an MX says nothing about them.

MX and SPF need not name the same hosts: MX controls inbound routing, SPF authorises outbound senders, and a domain that receives on one platform and sends through another is ordinary.

No MX can be the correct posture

A domain not intended to receive mail commonly publishes no MX at all while publishing a restrictive SPF (-all) and p=reject DMARC. That refuses inbound structurally and strongly protects against successful spoofing at DMARC-enforcing receivers: a forged message can still be transmitted, but compliant receivers reject or quarantine it.

Brand-shaped MX, no SPF, no DMARCNo MX, -all SPF, p=reject DMARC
Can receive mailNo (the tenant disowns it)No (no MX published)
Can be spoofed outboundYesNo, at enforcing receivers
ReadingDecorative record, unprotectedDeliberate, defensible

The configuration with the more brand-shaped mail record is the weaker one. MX absence is not a gap until SPF and DMARC are read alongside it.

Assessment matrix

CheckGoodWeakBad
SPF-all~all+all, missing, or non-public ip4:/ip6: literals
DMARCp=reject (a subdomain: its own p=, else the registrable domain’s sp=/p=)p=quarantinep=none on a production domain, or no record at the name and, for a subdomain, none at its registrable domain
DKIMValid key found-Not determinable from probed selectors: not a finding
MXAbsent on a non-mail domain, or naming the domain’s own tenant-Names another organisation’s mail tenant

A DMARC status of unknown is a gap in the check, not a “missing” row. A subdomain’s status: none is graded on the registrable domain’s record, as described under DMARC above. Very short DKIM keys (RSA under 1024 bits) fail; under 2048 bits is recorded as information.

Example workflow

# 1. Evaluated posture: SPF, DMARC, MX, DKIM at probed selectors, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT
datapulse_live_domain_health(domain="example.com")

# 2. The raw records, when a value needs quoting
datapulse_live_dns(domain="example.com")

# 3. A specific DKIM selector the domain is known to use
datapulse_live_dns(domain="s1._domainkey.example.com", record_type="TXT")

# 4. Has the mail provider changed? The history records MX hostnames and their ASNs over time
datapulse_dns_dphistory(domain="example.com")

The history (datapulse_help(topic="history")) holds MX, nameserver and web-hosting providers, not TXT records: it dates a change of mail provider, not a change of SPF or DMARC.

Generated from the live server (DataPulse MCP v0.9-341-g27163c2) on October 20, 2026. Your AI assistant reads this page by calling datapulse_help(topic="email_security").